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Abstract
This article discusses the discourse and practice of co-governance in disaster risk reduction (DRR). It is based on an ex-
tensive ethnographic study of DRR at global level and in two disaster-prone countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia and
Myanmar. These country cases were selected not only because of their similarly high vulnerability to disasters, but also
because the overlaps and differences between them in disaster governance allowed for a comparative study of the im-
pacts of co-governance in DRR. Indonesia is characterised by a longer history with democratic governance institutions and
a largely national-led response to disasters; Myanmar has only started to develop DRR in the last 10 years, and its policies
are still largely led by international actors. In both countries, disaster response has shifted from being top-down and state-
centred to following a co-governance approach. This reflects a worldwide trend in DRR, the idea being that co-governance,
where different state and non-state stakeholders are involved in governance networks, will lead to more inclusive and
effective DRR. Our findings suggest that, in Myanmar and Indonesia, DRR has indeed become more inclusive. However, at
the same time, we find that DRR in both countries has remained highly hierarchical and state-centred. Although the possi-
ble gains of encouraging future initiatives among different actors negotiating disaster response is under-explored, we find
that, to date, the multiplication of actors involved in DRR, especially within the state, has led to an increasingly complex,
competitive system that negatively affects the ability to conduct DRR.
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1. Introduction
For decades, disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been or-
ganised around an emergency style of top-down, state-
centred policies and institutions. But the past three
decades have seen a global development shifting disas-
ter response from reactive to proactive, from singular
to more holistic with a focus on DRR, and from a state-
centred model to forms of co-governance that recog-
nise the importance of non-state actor involvement in
disaster governance and of community-based initiatives
and resilience.
This emphasis on the need for inclusive co-
governance of disaster in global and national policies
is partly related to the recognition that disasters are
in many places growing in number and that recurring
events may have disastrous impacts but are at the same
time largely predictable and part of normality. ‘Living
with the floods’ is one of the catchphrases of this new
way of thinking, reflecting a change from an earlier per-
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spective that considered floods to be abnormal risk-
events thatwere addressedby technicalmeasures. In the
‘living with the floods’ era, the focus of disaster risk gov-
ernance (DRG) has shifted away from top-down emer-
gency response measures to softer measures, such as
improving the ways in which vulnerable populations and
their governments deal with recurrent floods and other
hazardous events. This also implies a shift in governance
away from top-down disaster management and towards
co-governed forms of response that involve different seg-
ments and levels of the state, as well as societal actors.
The international community has converged on the
principle of ‘inclusive DRR’, which denotes ‘the collabo-
ration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across
different scales’ (Gaillard & Mercer, 2012, p. 95). In poli-
cies and meetings, the global DRR community has con-
sistently repeated the expected advantages of inclusive
DRR governance, stressing that it will lead to more inclu-
sive and effective disaster governance (Djalante, 2012).
To achieve inclusive DRR, it is necessary to strengthen
and alter the ways in which countries and institutions
govern disaster. It is now widely believed that effective
DRG requires the strong engagement of multiple actors
involved in DRR in a country.
The United Nations International Strategy for Disas-
ter Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has claimed that ‘good gov-
ernance’ of disasters should be shared by multiple state
and non-state actors in a country to ‘elevate disaster risk
reduction into a policy priority, allocate the necessary re-
sources to it, ensure and enforce its implementation and
assign accountability for failures, as well as facilitate par-
ticipation by all relevant stakeholders’ (UNISDR, 2004).
Governance networks are widely expected to con-
tribute to more effective DRG (UNISDR, 2013; Warner,
Waalewijn, & Hilhorst, 2002, p. 2). Moreover, the report
of the Hyogo Framework for Action claimed that multi-
stakeholder platforms would contribute significantly to
‘integrating DRR into sustainable development policies
and supporting less developed countries in implement-
ing the HFA [Hyogo Framework for Action]’ (Djalante,
2012, p. 2924). It is also believed throughout the global
disaster community that this and other governance net-
works could stimulate learning and innovation (Djalante,
2012, p. 2932).
DRR platforms have now become common in most
disaster-prone countries. Since 1987, United Nations
(UN) member states have been invited to establish
‘national committees’—co-governance platforms that
should consist of multiple actors involved in DRR, includ-
ing representatives of governments, international organ-
isations, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the
scientific community. UNISDR has actively encouraged
the establishment of national governance networks’ to
provide and mobilise knowledge, skills and resources
required for mainstreaming DRR into development poli-
cies, planning and programmes’ (UNISDR, 2007). Data
from UNISDR indicate that around 93 national platforms
on DRR had developed worldwide as of 2016 (UNISDR,
2017). Both Myanmar and Indonesia have established
such a platform.
Several scholars have studied disaster management
networks in Asia. For instance, Djalante (2012) studied
adaptive governance and multi-stakeholder platforms in
Indonesia using a multi-stakeholder approach; Raju and
Niekerk (2013) discussed multi-organisational coordina-
tion for disaster recovery in India; and Chui, Feng and
Jordan (2014) used the same lens to explore advocacy
coalition frameworks in the context of policy change
in Taiwan. These authors have all related the principle
of governance network to a disaster-related context in
Asia. Djalante (2012, p. 2923) advocated the concept
of adaptive governance as an ‘alternative’ in governing
disaster management and placed multi-stakeholder plat-
forms at the heart of this approach, arguing that multi-
stakeholder platforms offer a way to manage problems
with flexible and adjustable governance systems. Raju re-
ferred to ‘coordination structures’ to describe the net-
work arena of disaster recovery. He argued that effective
DRR politics requires clarity on rules, a willingness to co-
ordinate, strong leadership and deliberative command.
Finally, Chui et al. (2014) addressed advocacy within
the groundwork of ‘advocacy coalition framework[s]’. In
their study, they argued that the success of advocacy
through coalitions and alliances is mainly determined by
stakeholders’ social engagement and common commit-
ment to work on collective action.
Despite the recognised importance of co-governance
of disaster, no academic research has specifically stud-
ied the internal dynamics among actors in DRR gover-
nance networks. Therefore, this article examines the dis-
courses and practices of different governance networks
that were established to reduce disaster risk in Indonesia
and Myanmar. Our article is based on extensive ethno-
graphic fieldwork conducted in two country case studies
and among a global-level DRG-governance network.
Our research aimed to understand to what extent
DRR in Indonesia and Myanmar is indeed inclusive and
co-governed by multiple state and non-state actors. Al-
though it has often been suggested in the literature and
in policy reports that inclusive DRR and effective DRG
face challenges (Djalante, 2012, p. 2925; Raju & Niekerk,
2013, p. 92), not much is known about the daily prac-
tices, problems and experiences of state and non-state
actors involved in DRR. Looking beyond the policy com-
mitments on expected inclusiveness and other positive
outcomes, this article investigates the realities of the ac-
tual practice of inclusive DRR in DRG in Indonesia and
Myanmar and asks how the principle of inclusiveness
works in practice. Has it lived up to its promise to achieve
commonobjectives and resolve conflicts? Towhat extent
are stateswilling to negotiate the power arrangements in
their partnerships with non-state actors?
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2. Conceptual Frameworks
2.1. Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Risk
Governance
In the academic and policy literature, DRR is defined as
a means of ‘preventing new and reducing existing dis-
aster risk to strengthen resilience’ (UNISDR, 2007). Be-
yond this definition, DRR has been understood as a ‘con-
ceptual framework to minimise vulnerabilities and dis-
aster risks, to avoid (prevention) and to limit (mitiga-
tion and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards’
(UNISDR, 2008). In the context of DRR, the concept of
DRG has been used as a frame to explain structural ar-
rangements and multifaceted interactions among actors
working with the objective of reducing risk.
The phrase ‘disaster risk governance’ has been used
extensively in policy practice. UNISDR refers to DRG as
‘the system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and le-
gal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coor-
dinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related
areas of policy’ (UNISDR, 2007). In the DRR global pol-
icy setting, the Guiding Principles of the Sendai Frame-
work for Action 2015–2030 explicitly states that ‘dis-
aster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engage-
ment and partnership’. It requires empowerment and in-
clusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation,
paying special attention to people disproportionately af-
fected by disasters, especially those belonging to the
poorest groups in society. Inclusiveness in DRR is strongly
related to the involvement of all actors in collective ac-
tion on DRR.
DRG, in contrast to disaster governance, aims to ap-
proach the complex dynamics of institutional settings,
power relations and policy advocacy in the specific con-
text of reducing risk. DRG concerns the entire structure
of the phases of disaster management (preparedness,
response, recovery and rehabilitation). However, many
authors use the phrases ‘disaster risk governance’ and
‘disaster governance’ interchangeably, and a substantial
number of well-written journal articles using the phrase
‘disaster governance’ may be seen to speak about DRG
(Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Cho, 2014; Enia, 2013; Gerber,
2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Moe, 2010; Niekerk,
2015; Seng, 2010; Tierney, 2012).
2.2. Disaster Risk Governance
‘Governance’ is different from ‘government’. Whereas
government is associated with the ‘authoritative expres-
sion of the state’ that is ‘usually thought to dictate to
and control other state bodies’ (Heywood, 2004, p. 77),
governance denotes ‘interorganizational networks’ that
‘complementmarkets and hierarchies as governing struc-
tures’ (Rhodes, 1996, p. 652). More specifically, the con-
cept of governance is defined as ‘a complex set of val-
ues, norms, processes and institutions used by a society
to manage its development and resolve conflict’ (Kohler-
Koch, 2005). Governance is a way of steering and gov-
erning by engaging non-state actors in the policy pro-
cess (Ewalt, 2001; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996;
Stoker, 1998; van Leeuwen & van Tatenhove, 2010). Gov-
ernance aims to challenge the traditional policy process,
where the state stands as the core entity. Governance
networks are considered to be ‘self-organising’ when ac-
tors develop and regulate their interactions using rules
of the game that are ‘negotiated and agreed’ by the
participants, rather than following the dictates of the
state (Rhodes, 1996). Governance scholars frequently
use terms such as ‘coordination, cooperation, partner-
ship, joint-working, alliance, collaboration, and network’
(Mardiah, Lovett, & Evanty, 2017, p. 58). Governance net-
works emphasise the work of multiple actors who act
autonomously but relate interdependently within the in-
stitutionalised framework of the policy-making process
(Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2012).
3. Methods and Case Selection
This article is based on an ethnographic study conducted
by the first author. The co-authors guided the study and
participated in the analysis and writing. At the global
level, the first author participated in the World Confer-
ence on DRR, in Sendai, 2015, and the Asian Ministerial
Conference on DRR, in Bangkok, 2014. At the latter con-
ference, the first author attended a high-level ministe-
rial meeting as an observer. The research was primar-
ily conducted through long-term fieldwork and participa-
tory observation in DRG-governance networks in Myan-
mar and Indonesia.
Indonesia and Myanmar were selected as cases for
the study because they offer relevant, contrasting po-
litical contexts: Indonesia has a longer history with
democratic governance institutions, as well as a largely
national-led response to disasters. Myanmar, in contrast,
has only started to develop DRG over the past 10 years,
and policies are still largely led by international actors.
Both countries are also extremely vulnerable to dis-
asters, making disaster response a particularly relevant
topic of study. Asia has the highest number of disas-
ter events in the world. Data from the Asian Disaster
Reduction Centre show that 44.4% of the world’s disas-
ter events have occurred in Asia. The hazardous profile
corresponds to 82% of the people killed, 94% of those
affected and 88.7% of the total economic damage from
disaster events worldwide being in Asia (Asian Disaster
Reduction Center, 2011). Within Southeast Asia, Indone-
sia and Myanmar have the highest levels of vulnerability,
based on the indicator of the average annual number of
casualties per one million residents (UNISDR, 2010). The
enormous number of people killed in the 2004 tsunami
mega-disaster and in cyclone Nargis in 2008 showed
both countries’ high level of susceptibility to disasters.
The research design involved the use ofmultiple qual-
itative methods of data collection for each of the case
studies: (1) desk study to review and analyse policy docu-
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ments and the basic conceptual framework of the politics
of DRG, global frameworks on DRR, global norms, politi-
cal changes and decentralisation; (2) semi-structured in-
terviews with government officials and non-state actors
from both international organisations and NGOs; (3) fo-
cus groupdiscussions inwhich various community groups
at the village level were interviewed to study community
perspectives towards risk, the DRR project, NGOs and the
roles of the government; (4) a qualitative impact study
to observe the implementation of a DRR project at the
community level by an alliance of NGOs; and (5) partic-
ipant observation in focus group discussions, reviewing
minutes of meetings and observations from national and
international conferences/workshops, and participation
in an internship programme at a UN agency in Myanmar.
The field research was conducted over a time span
of 18 months. A total of 129 people in Indonesia and
78 in Myanmar participated in this research through
semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions.
These participants included both government officials
and non-state actors (working for international disaster-
governance organisations or NGOs). The researchers
used purposive sampling to select the interviewees by
identifying and selecting participants based on their in-
volvement in DRG.
The interviews addressed four topics: the role of ac-
tors, the agenda, interaction with other stakeholders
and the articulation of interests (power relations). In In-
donesia, the interviews were conducted in the local lan-
guage, Bahasa Indonesia. In Myanmar, both English and
Burmese were used, with the aid of an interpreter.
4. Research Findings
4.1. Political Changes in Indonesia and Myanmar
Influence the Strengthening of Inclusive Disaster Risk
Governance
4.1.1. Decentralised Disaster Risk Governance
in Indonesia
Indonesia offers a strong example of how political
changes influence DRG, on both the national and the
local level. In 1998, Indonesian political reforms com-
prehensively introduced decentralisation. This decentral-
isation has inspired the architecture of DRG in Indone-
sia, where provincial and regency1 governments have
been made entirely responsible for the implementation
of the DRR policy agenda. The DisasterManagement Law
No 24, 2007 mandates the central and regency govern-
ments to share responsibility and authority for disaster
management. At the national level, referring to the Law
No 24, 2007, Article 12, the Indonesian National Agency
for DisasterManagement (Badan Nasional Penanggulan-
gan Bencana [BNPB]) was established to provide guid-
ance, direction, standards and requirements for disaster
management (Law No 24, 2007, Article 12).
From 2010 to 2013, Indonesian Regional Agencies
for Disaster Management (Badan Penanggulangan Ben-
cana Daerah [BPBD]) were introduced. BPBDs were es-
tablished in almost 90% of the provinces and regions
in Indonesia (BNPB, 2014). In addition, the growth of
democratisation beginning in 1998 has led to the increas-
ing influence of non-state actors and community initia-
tives. Freedom of speech is one of the pillars of politi-
cal reform in Indonesia, and it appears that many non-
state actors want to have a voice in DRR politics. In-
donesian civil society actively engages in DRR through
several multi-stakeholder platforms that are indepen-
dent of the government: the National Platform (Platform
Nasional [PLANAS]), Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster
Management (Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia),
Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management (Ikatan
Ahli Bencana Indonesia), the University Forum (Forum
Universitas), the Region DRR Forum (Forum Peduli Ben-
cana Daerah) and the Village DRR Forum (Forum Peduli
Bencana Desa).
However, in practice, we found that the co-gov-
ernance of disaster appeared complex and frustrating for
many of the actors involved. Evenwhen interviewees the-
oretically supported the idea of co-governance, indicat-
ing that it would make disaster management more ef-
fective through empowering local actors, they also high-
lighted many practical problems with its implementation.
The head of BNPB, the Indonesian National Agency
for Disaster Management, considered the independence
of local government to be one of the indicators of na-
tional resilience. ‘Local government acts as the frontline
in formulating local policy’, he said in an interview, ‘ar-
ranging resources and building community capacity’. This
idea was articulated in a similar way by multiple staff
members working at the national level. It echoes the
idea of ‘empowering’ local government to govern dis-
aster management without depending on the hierarchy
of a top-down control mechanism. A mid-level Ministry
of Home Affairs officer emphasised that, as long as the
provincial and regency levels can perform disaster man-
agement, the main responsibility of the central govern-
ment is mostly to provide guidance, assistance and ca-
pacity building:
Like children who first learn to walk, if they [the
provincial/regency governments] fall, let it be; it’s part
of the learning process. However, if they walk and
stagger unsteadily, we [the central government] will
be there to help them. (interviewwith amaleMinistry
of Home Affairs officer, 1 November 2015)
In contrast, at the local level, BPBD staff members spoke
of ‘decentralised disaster risk governance’ in a negative
tone. They mentioned the lack of budget, human re-
sources and capacity as factors hampering their work in
the region. For example, one of the BPBD heads claimed
that ‘It’s better to work in a vertical structure with BNPB
1 The term ‘regency’ in the Indonesian context refers to a sub-national level of government.
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because the budget from the regency level is limited’ (in-
terview with a male BPBD head in Nusa Tenggara Timor,
28 July 2014).
The same informant also explained that staff capacity
had degraded because of decentralisation:
In bureaucracy, you will not get promoted if you’re
not moving to a different office [function]; at mini-
mum, youwould be rotated to twodifferent functions.
Thus, on the previous DRR Day held in Bengkulu, we—
all the heads of BPBD—wanted to have centralisation
with BNPB. [Centralisation] would make the rotation
of human resources rest on the responsibility of BNPB,
and it would no longer be part of the authority of the
Head of Regency. Here, we have often received new
staff from different functions that have nothing to do
with disastermanagement—for instance, the rotation
of staff from the Department of Agriculture—so every
year we received new staff who understand nothing.
(interviewwith amale head of BPBD in Nusa Tenggara
Timur, 28 July 2014)
Similar complaints were made by several of this infor-
mant’s colleagues. These complaints were often related
to the regency office’s financial situation. At the meeting
of the Indonesian delegation for the World Conference
on DRR, a high-ranking BNPB officer noted that, for the
five-year period from 2015 to 2019, the central agency
of BNPB received IDR 8.7 trillion (equal to EUR 580 mil-
lion). This is extremely high comparedwith the budget of
BPBD at the regency level in NTT (IDR 6.5 billion, equal to
EUR 433,000). Although BNPB is allocated approximately
IDR 1.2 billion–2.4 billion yearly for each province, some
BPBD personnel said that they never received the fund-
ing. A head of BPBD explained what happens in reality:
We received financial assistance from BNPB during a
disaster response in the aftermath of a volcanic erup-
tion; aside from that, we don’t receive anything. (In-
terview with a male BPBD head in NTT, 28 July 2014)
Furthermore, it became clear from the interviews that
BPBD had insufficient funds to deliver services on DRR-
specific agendas. Our analysis of the BPBD budget docu-
ment showed that budget allocations for DRR are equal
to the operations budget (e.g., staff expenses, business
trips, accommodations, transportation, consultancy and
meals); hence, there are no funds set aside for activities
at community level or investments in DRR. Poor capacity
also leads to weak budget absorption at the local level.
The national systemobliges government bodies to return
unspent funds to the Ministry of Finance at the end of
fiscal year, and, because of the obstacles described here,
the funds were often received too late, at the end of the
fiscal year:
Most of the budget was returned to Jakarta [at the
end of the fiscal year] because some BPBD [agencies]
did not know how to use it and the budget came
too late. (Interview with a male BNPB staff member,
17 November 2014)
In addition to a lack of financial resources, there were
also problems concerning human resources. Decentral-
isation has shifted political gravity to the subnational
level. In practice, this leads to a situation where the
promotion and rotation of government officials happens
within and between local administrative bodies, which
hampers specialisation.
During an interview, a head of BPBD noted that BPBD
is perceived as a new player in the bureaucracy arena
at the regency level, and as ‘hardly powerful, unpopular
and an outcast’. He also explained that BPBD suffers from
high rotation among its officials, who have insufficient
backgrounds and competencies because the agency de-
pends on staff allocated to them by the mayor and the
governor, who have no special interest in DRR:
Every time we trained BPBD staff, the government of-
ficers who came to Jakarta were new staff members.
Decentralisation has [led to] a high and dynamic ro-
tation for government officers. I spoke in front of the
mayor at a meeting and asked whether the head of
BPBD could be exempted from bureaucratic rotation.
But they [the mayor] said, ‘it’s a decentralisation era;
we [themayors] are the ones who knowwho have the
potential to lead [BPBD]’. (Interviewwith amale BNPB
staff member, 17 November 2014)
Another informant said that ‘Bureaucratic rotation
in BPBD is also our problem, but we can’t push
more because it’s a decentralisation era’ (interview on
1 November 2015). The high rotation of officials hin-
ders the sustainability of BPBD’s programme and is detri-
mental to the process of knowledge transfer within
the organisation.
In conclusion, although actors at both the national
and the local level support the idea of co-governance in
theory, they face challenges in daily practice. In particu-
lar, BPBD suffers from insufficient human resource capac-
ity caused by a premature decentralisation process and
strong local politics, resulting in government officials not
being adequately qualified based on merit.
4.1.2. Disaster Risk Governance in Transitional Myanmar
In 2008, cyclone Nargis created momentum for Myan-
mar to open up to the international community. The
cyclone was the worst disaster in Myanmar’s history,
claiming the lives of an estimated 138,000 people. Nar-
gis turned out to be a game changer in the policy arena
of DRR. In the national arena, the government of Myan-
mar has been working closely with the Disaster Risk Re-
duction Working Group (DRR WG), which aims to assist
the government in achieving a ‘resilient country’ environ-
ment. Since its establishment after Nargis in 2008, the
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DRR WG has transformed into a multi-stakeholder net-
work. Its members include auxiliary government bodies
(e.g., Myanmar Red Cross); international organisations
(United Nations Development Programme and others);
international and national NGOs; donor agencies (e.g.,
Japan International Cooperation Agency, Caritas Switzer-
land); professional societies (e.g., Myanmar Engineering
Society) and academic organisations (e.g., Yangon Tech-
nological University, University of Yangon). The DRR WG
is the platform to discuss, formulate and implement the
DRR agenda. Although the government is one of the ac-
tors in this network, this working group is positioned out-
side the government structure on disaster management.
The DRR WG has been involved in policy consultations,
providing technical support to the government on pol-
icy development and report preparation, including de-
veloping a draft note for Myanmar’s 2015 ‘Action Plan
for DRR’.
In a transitional setting such asMyanmar, the change
process is mostly felt in urban areas like Yangon. The fol-
lowing interviewextracts show that, at the local level (dis-
trict, township, village-tract), the status quo has predom-
inantly been maintained, and international actors in par-
ticular described a lack of translation of policy to lower
levels of governance:
The top level of the government changes, but themid-
dle level and the lower level is not [changing] as fast
as the top level. (interview with a female UN agency
programme coordinator, 17 October 2014)
The middle–low bureaucratic staff have poor knowl-
edge/capacity on disaster management and do not
always understand the reality on the ground. (Inter-
view with a female UN agency staff member, 17 Octo-
ber 2014)
But problems were not felt only at local levels. From the
interviews with national-level actors involved in disaster
management, it became clear that the new practice of
the governance network has exposed the national gov-
ernment to a new way of governing. This is challenging.
It is a daily experience for government decision-makers
in Myanmar to receive requests to establish cooperation
and partnership from International Organizations, NGOs
and the private sector. Consequently, the ongoing transi-
tion pushes the government to reform almost all aspects
of policy. The government is occupied with this reform
process, including new partnership arrangements from
various initiatives. This situation often leads to long de-
lays in the decision-making process.
Government departments in this transition period—
they are very, very busy. And then, they are not that
clear what is the direction, so there were many confu-
sions. In the past, they needed to listen to only the su-
pervisor, only the head of department. Now they have
to listen to [the] media while they also have to listen
to civil society also; then sometimes [they] take deci-
sions very slowly. (interview with a female UN agency
staff member, 17 October 2014)
[Working with the government] is like [a] double[-
edged] sword; now they are open, but everybody
now works with them. [There is a] lack of capac-
ity to coordinate [and] the demand is really high,
[but] the staffing, training people is the same quan-
tity. They don’t have a lot of capacity. They have to
build the capacity. Because it’s evolving with [a] differ-
ent structure—working groups, different ministries.
There are so many groups—how do they talk to each
other and link to each other? It has been a challenge
for the government and also for us. (Interview with
a male international NGO programme coordinator,
4 October 2014)
These interview extracts show how the government’s
exposure to the new practice of inclusiveness has also
had an impact on other actors in the governance net-
work. The delay of responses to the initiatives from
non-state actors is only one of the effects. There are
also implicit problems that endanger the commitment
to the governance network. In the heavily bureaucratic
government setting of Myanmar, some NGOs admitted
that it is difficult to get access to the highest levels
of government.
4.2. Heavy Organisational Set-Up of Disaster Risk
Governance
In both countries examined here, a striking feature of
DRG is its heavy organisational set-up. The implementa-
tion of ‘decentralised DRR’ in Indonesia remains prob-
lematic because of the complexity of power sharing be-
tween the central and local governments and because
of bureaucratic heaviness. In the present organisational
structure, BNPB and BPBD are connected by a ‘coordi-
nation line’ rather than a ‘command line’. The head of
BNPB applauded the independence of local government
as one of the indicators of national resilience. Local gov-
ernment acts as the frontline in formulating local policy,
he said, arranging resources and building community ca-
pacity. However, staff members of the regency body of
BPBDmentioned the aforementioned lack of budget, hu-
man resources and capacity as factors hampering their
work in the region.
In addition, intra-government coordination remains
a major issue for DRG in Indonesia, where approximately
22 ministries and government agencies work on DRR-
related issues. Inter-ministerial meetings were mostly
conducted ad hoc around programmes or events, with
no specific mechanism for regular coordination; for ex-
ample, in 2014, several ministries tried to work together
to integrate disaster management under the Rancangan
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional, with Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional coordinating.
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As the following comment by a research participant
suggests, such coordination of the bureaucracy-heavy or-
ganisation at the national level appeared to be a real chal-
lenge for DRG in Indonesia:
Coordination is easy to say but difficult to implement.
Each ministry has their own DRR movement, which
sometimes is not synergised and integrated. We aim
to control the planning, which before was the domain
of BAPPENAS and the Ministry of Finance. Now, all
programmes are brought to us before passing it to
BAPPENAS. (interview with a male Coordinating Min-
istry of Human Development and Culture staff mem-
ber, 4 November 2015)
In Myanmar, information exchange processes became
a real challenge for inter-ministerial coordination. The
coordination mechanisms among the ministries failed
to fill the information gap with other related ministries.
The Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement,
through the Relief and Resettlement Department, is
a key government body tasked with disaster manage-
ment. Other relevant ministries working intensely on
DRR-related issues include the Ministry of Environment
and Conservation of Forestry, the Ministry of Health, the
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Construction, and
Myanmar Safer Settlement and Urban Research. In a
dam construction project, the Relief and Resettlement
Department asserted that they had not been fully in-
formed about the construction process, although it was
crucial for them to ensure the construction was not tak-
ing place in ‘disaster-prone areas’: ‘We lacked complete
information on what and how they do it [the project]’.
Many informants expressed the view that, while the
transfiguration to open and engaging practice is ongo-
ing, the old bureaucratic culture, whichmostly promoted
a closed and command-driven hierarchy, continues to
exist. The highly bureaucratic command structure that
characterises Myanmar’s historical and political context
has also shaped the political culture of current govern-
ment officials, who have lived under decades of authori-
tarian leadership:
They [the government] were in the command sys-
tem for many years, they were trained to listen [to
the higher command]. It’s really difficult to change
the mind-set of the government department person-
nel…to have that interactive discussion, to have con-
sultation, to find the consensus….In the past, they
didn’t talk to people and people didn’t talk to gov-
ernment departments. People never think that if we
interact with government departments they will re-
spond….It’s not easy to talk together, to find the way
together. If we think that it will work, it is just a story.
It would not work in this short period. We need some
time to bridge through that situation. (interview with
a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)
This statement illustrates a tendency that was also men-
tioned in many other interviews: the heavy bureaucratic
structure continuously demanding a hierarchical and top-
down decision-making process. Within this procedural
structure, there are many potential pitfalls for achiev-
ing effective decision-making processes. Although there
have been some changes introduced, the old practice
of directing decision-making processes to higher author-
ities remains tangibly real.
4.3. Government Dominance in Disaster Risk
Governance
Another major issue found in the two countries con-
cerned the dominance of the government. In Indonesia,
the institutionalisation of DRR followed a co-governance
approach through the work of PLANAS, the National
Platform. This platform is a multi-stakeholder forum for
DRR in Indonesia in which the government is one of
the members. During interviews and focus group discus-
sions, both government and non-state actors acknowl-
edged the important role of each party and affirmed the
‘good partnership’. But, although on paper (and in for-
mal interviews with outsiders such as the first author)
civil society–government advocacy channels appear to
be relatively open, we found that, in practice, the re-
lations between government and non-state actors re-
mained highly asymmetrical. Representatives of PLANAS
revealed that parties work together to ‘a limited level’.
The government engages PLANAS only at the final stage
of policy evaluations. In interviews, members of the net-
work expressed demands for a more comprehensive en-
gagement. For example, PLANAS was not fully involved
in the formulation of DRR national planning and action
through the RPJMN or the National Action Plan on DRR
(Rencana Aksi Nasional), which serve as the primary ref-
erences for Indonesia’s national programme on DRR. In
other words, the government determines and controls
the policy process.
In Myanmar, interview with the DRR WG claimed to
be the ‘government-led model of DRR Coordination’ This
explicitly placed the government in a central position in
the network, which was reflected in the DRR WG strate-
gic framework, where three of six outcomes for the DRR
WGwere directed at meeting government needs (i.e., in-
clusive policy and a legal framework on DRR [outcome 1];
increased government capacity at all levels [outcome 2];
and the government being provided with tools, experi-
ences and capacities [outcome 3]). Additionally, the net-
work has very clearly been heading further in the direc-
tion of a ‘government-led’ platform. Although there was
room for negotiationwith the government, the power re-
lations between state and non-state actors were built on
an asymmetrical foundation with mutual benefits. The
government works closely with the DRR WG to achieve
the government’s agenda-setting goals, and the relation-
ship between the government and the DRR WG mem-
bers is crucial for achieving the group’s organisational
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mandates. However, the partnership initiative was un-
dertaken predominantly to fill the government’s needs
(demand-driven).
5. Conclusions
This article has presented findings about the inner work-
ings of the co-governance of DRG in Indonesia andMyan-
mar. In both countries, we found that the global trend
towards a shift from a top-down disaster response to co-
governed, inclusive forms of DRG is visible in the poli-
cies and organisation of governance. There were differ-
ences between the two countries, especially in relation
to the role of the international community (strong in
Myanmar) and the role of civil society (better recognised
in Indonesia). However, in both countries, we found that,
on closer scrutiny, it remains to be seen to what extent
the ideal of co-governance will move beyond rhetoric, as
both countries exhibit a tendency for the state to retain
central power and marginalise non-state actors. The ad-
vocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state actors has
been widening, but this space is also shrinking, because
the decision-making process has failed to develop into a
real partnership and the government remains dominant
in policy processes.
However, we also found that, in both Indonesia and
Myanmar, advocacy through alliances and consortiums
is continuously developing: Improvements in capacity,
resources and strategy to build a robust advocacy pro-
file significantly strengthen credibility and bargaining po-
sition vis-à-vis the government. Although we found that
shared commitment—considered crucial by Chui et al.
(2014)—is important, we emphasise that the influence
of stakeholders is determined by both the network and
the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the govern-
ment, and the process of interactive governance requires
actors on both sides (government and non-state actors)
to play an active role.
The co-governance model of DRG, despite its global
popularity, may not rest on a shared commitment. In
particular in Indonesia, we found that actors at decen-
tralised local levels would have preferred a clearer hier-
archical system that would give themmore leeway to de-
velop specialised DRR and a clear negotiation situation
to obtain more funds from the central level.
Our research also found that co-governance has led
to substantive implementation challenges. Far from clear
with respect to the rules and command structures that
Raju andNiekerk (2013) sawas key toDRG,we found that
the organisational structures in both countries are heavy
on bureaucracy and suffer from poorly integrated work,
coordination issues, and organisational ego and compe-
tition. Importantly, in both countries, we found that the
set-up of co-governance has not led to the strengthen-
ing of inclusive DRR at local levels. In Indonesia, decen-
tralised budgets leave no room for DRR programmes at
local level, and, in Myanmar, co-governance has not yet
been translated to the local level. Even though we find
that co-governance has led to more inclusion in policy
processes in both countries, the prospect of more effec-
tive and innovative DRR at the local level (Djalante, 2012)
remains elusive.
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